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Substantially Deferring to Revenue 
Rulings After Mead 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Death and taxes—these, according to the modern quip, are the 
only two certainties in life. While the necessity of paying taxes will 
remain a constant in life, the amount, when, to whom, or for what 
period one pays is far from certain.1 The questions arising from the 
Internal Revenue Code and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
regulations may be almost as constant as the fact that the number of 
people who live will die. In an effort to clarify various uncertainties in 
the tax code and accompanying regulations for the benefit of the 
public and IRS personnel, the IRS began issuing revenue rulings, 
which interpret various complex and ambiguous issues of tax law.2 
Traditionally, courts granted revenue rulings considerable deference. 
Two of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding deference to 
administrative interpretations of law, however, call into question the 
level of deference courts should accord revenue rulings. 
Charged with the important responsibility of overseeing the 
revenue of the United States,3 the IRS has employed various means 
 1. See, e.g., MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 3.01 (rev. 2d 
ed. 2003) (explaining that the complexities of the Tax Code require “[t]axpayers and others” 
to seek guidance from the IRS and detailing the various ways in which the IRS provides 
clarifications of the Internal Revenue Code). 
 2. See, e.g., id. ¶ 3.03; Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS 
Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841, 845–46 (1992) (citing Rev. Rul. 2, 1953-1 C.B. 484); 
see also infra Part II. 
 3. The importance of revenue gathering for the United States can hardly be overstated 
and is found paramount in the powers given to Congress under the Constitution. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises . . . .”); id. amend. XVI; see also Shu-Yi Oei, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of 
Bankruptcy Courts over Post-Confirmation Federal Tax Liabilities: Towards a New 
Jurisprudence of 11 U.S.C. § 505, 19 AKRON TAX J. 49, 65 (2004) (noting the great 
importance of the federal tax system). The Articles of Confederation’s lack of power (or 
insufficient power) over taxation was an important reason behind the Constitutional 
Convention and formation of our current Constitution. See generally ROGER H. BROWN, 
REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC: FEDERALISTS, TAXATION, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1993); E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776–1790 (1961). The IRS has had charge of the fiscal needs 
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to administer its exponentially growing duty.4 Revenue rulings are a 
primary means by which the IRS administers the tax laws of the 
United States,5 being an efficient way for the IRS to pronounce 
official interpretations of “the internal revenue laws and related 
statutes, treaties, and regulations.”6 
Because of the IRS’s important duty and the official nature of 
revenue rulings, many courts historically gave these IRS legal 
interpretations considerable deference,7 especially after Chevron 
of the United States since 1862. See SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 1.01[2]. Although its duties 
from the Civil War until the beginning of the twentieth century were minor in comparison to 
contemporary responsibilities, beginning in 1913 and with the enactment of the Sixteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, the IRS increased in responsibility and complexity to meet 
the various needs of the country and to fulfill its obligation as administrator of the United 
States’ revenue. See id. 
 4. See SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 1.07 (summarizing the many ways in which the IRS 
performs its duties as an administrative body, including rule making, adjudication, and 
informal actions such as tests, inspections, claims processing, negotiations, and informal 
advice). 
 5. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(explaining that revenue rulings are one of four ways in which the IRS interprets the tax code); 
26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (2005) (stating the purposes of revenue rulings as 
“promot[ing] correct and uniform application of the tax laws . . . assist[ing] taxpayers in 
attaining maximum voluntary compliance by informing Service personnel and the public of 
National Office interpretations of the internal revenue laws, related statutes, treaties, 
regulations, and statements of Service procedures”); SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 3.03[1] 
(explaining that revenue rulings are the official form for IRS pronouncements made 
“‘whenever appropriate in the interest of sound tax administration’” (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 
601.201(a)(1))). 
 6. Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814; see also Galler, supra note 2, at 842 (explaining 
that revenue rulings are a “frequent[] and expeditious[]” way for the IRS to interpret the 
revenue laws). 
 7. See, e.g., Amato v. W. Union Int’l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1411 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing 
various cases dating back to 1979 for the proposition that revenue rulings were entitled to 
great deference and carried “the force of legal precedents”); Carle Found. v. United States, 
611 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1979) (giving rulings weight); Comm’r v. O. Liquidating 
Corp., 292 F.2d 225, 230–31 (3d Cir. 1961) (giving revenue rulings great weight to the point 
of being dispositive); see also John V. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of 
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings after Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 79–80 (2003) 
(arguing against granting revenue rulings Chevron deference, but nonetheless conceding that a 
few cases before Chevron and “virtually all the courts” after “moved toward giving revenue 
rulings significant deference”). But see Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: 
Reconciling Divergent Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1062 (1995) (stating that almost 
every federal circuit had “issued contradictory opinions regarding the weight of revenue 
rulings,” and noting that the tax courts have neither historically nor contemporarily given 
revenue rulings any weight whatsoever). 
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U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.8 The Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions in Christensen v. Harris County9 and United 
States v. Mead Corp.,10 however, potentially eliminate any actual 
deference previously accorded these IRS pronouncements.11 The 
language in these cases potentially indicates that courts should 
accord revenue rulings mere respect under Skidmore v. Swift Co.12 
Skidmore’s respect is not, however, actual deference. 
Courts have long given deference to administrative agency 
interpretations of law,13 including revenue rulings, because of the 
 8. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 9. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 10. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 11. See Coverdale, supra note 7, at 89–91 (arguing that after the Court’s decisions in 
Christensen and Mead, revenue rulings are entitled only to Skidmore deference, that is, only the 
deference warranted by the rulings’ persuasiveness); see also infra, Part IV.A. 
 12. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 13. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 3.1, at 108–09 (1994) (listing a line of cases such as NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 
322 U.S. 111 (1944), that date back to the beginning of the last century and deal with 
deference to agency pronouncements); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Why Deference?: Implied 
Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 
736 (2002) (explaining that for decades before the Court’s decision in Chevron, which was 
decided in 1984, courts gave deference to agency interpretations of law (citing SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (laying the foundation for deferring to agencies because of 
agency expertise, among other things))).  
Throughout, this Comment uses the terms “interpretation of law” and “application of 
law” interchangeably to refer to administrative agencies’ interpretation law given specific facts 
and issues confronting the agency and to the practice of setting and defining administrative 
policy. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
pure interpretations of law or statutory construction remain the province of courts, and no 
deference results from agency interpretations of pure issues of law. Id. at 447–48 (“‘The 
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative 
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional 
tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise 
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.’” (quoting Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted))). However, deference does arise from agency applications 
of law, which involve interpretation, or from agency pronouncements of policy through like 
situations:  
The narrow legal question whether the two standards are the same is, of course, 
quite different from the question of interpretation that arises in each case in which 
the agency is required to apply either or both standards to a particular set of facts. 
There is obviously some ambiguity in a term like “well-founded fear” which can 
only be given concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication. In 
that process of filling “any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,” the courts 
must respect the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the 
responsibility for administering the statutory program.  
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complexity of regulatory schemes, the expertise developed in 
administrative bodies, and the congressional desire to invest agencies 
with the authority and duty of administering the law.14 The standards 
by which to judge that deference and when that deference is 
warranted have changed over time.15 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resource Defense Council, however, the Supreme Court 
made this stance toward administrative interpretations of law 
uniform—courts must defer to administrative agencies’ 
interpretations of law when the statute is ambiguous and the 
interpretation is reasonable.16 Under this approach, most courts 
granted revenue rulings substantial deference,17 even though revenue 
rulings are less formal than traditional Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) procedures for rulemaking.18
Id. at 448 (citations omitted) (explaining Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). 
 14. See, e.g., Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (explaining 
various reasons for according deference to revenue rulings, but specifying congressional intent 
to invest administrative agencies with authority to make policy decisions); Batterton v. Francis, 
432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); Corn Prods. Co. v. Comm’r, 350 U.S. 46, 52–53 (1955) 
(giving deference to an interpretation that had lasted three congressional reenactments); John 
F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 42 (1995) (explaining that before the Court’s Chevron decision and 
“[u]nder traditional deference doctrine, the weight courts gave to agency interpretations 
depended on many factors, including: the perceived expertise of the agency, the technical 
complexity of the subject matter, the consistency with which the agency had maintained the 
view expressed in the rule being considered, and the amount of time that passed between the 
enactment of the statute and the promulgation of the rule that interpreted it”) (collecting 
various cases). 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. 467 U.S. at 842–44, 865–66; see also Coverdale, supra note 14, at 42–43 
(explaining that Chevron altered the basis for deference, a basis that rests on uniform 
characteristics, i.e., policymaking authority invested in administrative agencies). 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000). Rulemaking under the APA generally requires 
formal procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudications. Notice-and-
comment procedures, for example, require proposed rules be published in the Federal Register 
and include various notices describing the rule, the place where “public rule making 
proceedings” will take place, the authority for the rule, and a general description. Id. Once 
notice is given, agencies then give the public an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking 
process: 
[T]he agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule 
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without 
opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter 
presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general 
statement of their basis and purpose. 
Id. § 553(c).  
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The Supreme Court recently altered course, however, concerning 
when Chevron deference is due to administrative interpretations of 
law. In Christensen v. Harris County19 and United States v. Mead 
Corp.,20 the Court limited Chevron by requiring that the legal 
interpretation for which one seeks Chevron-level deference “carry the 
force of law.”21 While the Court did not clearly explain what it meant 
by “carry the force of law,” it did point to three ways in which an 
agency interpretation of law may receive substantial Chevron-level 
deference. The Supreme Court explained that delegation, and 
therefore authority, may arise “in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s 
power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable 
congressional intent.”22 Thus, arguably more informal interpretations 
of law by an administrative agency—that is, those interpretations that 
do not follow from formal agency rulemaking—are no longer 
entitled to Chevron deference because they do not carry the force of 
law.23 In both Christensen and Mead the Court explained, 
nonetheless, that when a more informal pronouncement by an 
agency fails to receive Chevron deference, it may still warrant 
deference under Skidmore,24 which grants deference to an agency 
interpretation to the degree that a court finds the pronouncement 
persuasive.25
On its face, this recent general development has obfuscated the 
degree of deference that revenue rulings receive.26 Although Mead 
did not directly deal with the level of deference to give revenue 
rulings, lower courts have, in applying Mead, granted revenue rulings 
 19. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 20. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 21. Id. at 221, 226–27; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
 22. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. 
 23. See Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 737 (explaining the import of Christensen and 
Mead as looking to the formality of the agency pronouncement); see also infra Part III. 
 24. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234–35; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (noting that 
“interpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are ‘entitled to respect’ under our 
decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.”). 
 25. Mead, 533 U.S. at 235 (explaining that more informal interpretations receive 
“respect proportional to [their] ‘power to persuade’”); see also infra Part III. 
 26. See Coverdale, supra note 7, at 89–91 (arguing that after Mead, revenue rulings are 
only entitled to deference according to their persuasiveness); cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority’s opinion in Mead works a fundamental change in 
the law concerning deference to administrative interpretations of law). 
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only Skidmore’s persuasive deference. In essence, after Mead lower 
courts have robbed revenue rulings of the actual and substantial 
deference they deserve by giving these pronouncements mere 
Skidmore respect.27 While courts may find rulings persuasive, they do 
not “defer” to them. 
Robbing revenue rulings of any claim to actual deference will 
diminish the IRS’s ability to inform taxpayers and IRS personnel of 
the law and ultimately to set IRS policy and ensure voluntary 
compliance with revenue laws. While courts may use the term 
“deference” when examining revenue rulings, courts can now simply 
conduct their own interpretation of the law under the guise of 
Skidmore respect. Such judicial discretion prevents the IRS from 
slowly crafting its policy through interpretations of the law that 
Congress has tasked it with administering. More importantly, the 
IRS can no longer authoritatively explain difficult issues of tax law. 
The practical effect of Christensen and Mead is that courts have 
become the real interpreters of tax law, and revenue rulings have 
become the IRS’s hope, its aspiration. The result is a weakened 
administrative body responsible for the revenue of the United States. 
Additionally, weakening the deference accorded revenue rulings 
undermines a primary goal of the United States’ tax laws, a goal that 
revenue rulings are designed to advance—voluntary compliance.28
 27. See infra Part IV; see also Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has No Clothes: 
Christensen, Mead and Dual Deference Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 179 (2002). 
 28. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (2005) (stating that the purpose behind revenue 
rulings is to “assist taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary compliance”). Voluntary 
compliance is an essential aspect of the success of the tax system of the United States. See, e.g., 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 7 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 2902 (Tax 
Reform Act of 1976). Congress specifically noted that 
[f]or decades, the tax system of the United States has been envied by other nations 
of the world. It collects . . . billion[s] in revenues each year . . . with relatively little 
administrative burden and in a manner that has not prevented steady economic 
growth over most of the postwar period. This success is based on a high degree of 
voluntary compliance with the tax laws since only a small percentage of tax returns 
are audited each year, and voluntary compliance depends on taxpayers’ 
understanding the relevant tax laws and forms and believing that others are also 
paying their fair share of the overall tax burden. It is essential for the nation’s 
political and economic stability that the tax system be both simple and equitable, 
characteristics which are, of course, also desirable for their own sake.  
Id. 
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Contrary to the lower deference courts and commentators have 
accorded these pronouncements after Mead,29 revenue rulings ought 
to receive substantial and actual deference. Rather than mere 
Skidmore respect, revenue rulings deserve Chevron deference under a 
category of procedures Mead contemplated as providing sufficient 
indicia that Congress delegated authority to the agency. Revenue 
rulings provide precisely the type of fair and deliberate process 
sufficient to warrant substantial deference after Mead.  
Part II details what revenue rulings are and the function they 
serve. Part III explains the lengthy legal background of court 
deference to administrative interpretations of law and specifically 
court deference to revenue rulings. Part IV argues for substantial 
deference to revenue rulings. Rather than a mere search for 
congressional intent, Mead’s inquiry, at base, requires a sufficiently 
fair and deliberate procedure in issuing agency interpretations of law 
to warrant Chevron deference. While the outer limits of which 
procedures qualify for heightened deference remain uncertain, 
revenue rulings provide the type of formal, fair, and deliberate 
procedure Mead requires for courts to grant substantial deference. 
Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. REVENUE RULINGS 
Revenue rulings are an essential and regular means for the IRS to 
interpret, explain, and clarify the revenue code and its regulations,30 
even if some courts struggle with the deference the rulings deserve.31 
 29. See infra Part III.E. 
 30. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (“A Revenue Ruling is an official interpretation 
by the Service that has been published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.”); Rev. Proc. 89-14, 
1989-1 C.B. 814; Galler, supra note 2, at 842 (“[T]he IRS may promulgate revenue rulings 
frequently and expeditiously. These pronouncements play a vital role in statutory 
administration . . . .”). 
 31. See Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n v. United States, 379 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(noting that the amount of deference to give revenue rulings is an open question); Ammex, 
Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2004) (questioning whether revenue 
rulings are entitled to Chevron deference). See also United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball 
Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219–20 (2001) (declining to decide whether revenue rulings are entitled 
to deference); Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 485 (1990) (giving some deference but 
not deciding how much). Compare Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 347 F.3d 173, 181 
(6th Cir. 2003) (holding that revenue rulings do not deserve Chevron deference after Mead 
and Christensen), with IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 
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Generally, the IRS interprets the tax code and, sometimes, its own 
regulations in “one of four ways,”32 which are “(1) regulations issued 
pursuant to a specific directive from Congress, (2) regulations issued 
under the IRS’s general authority to interpret the tax laws, (3) 
revenue rulings, and (4) private letter rulings.”33 Each of these 
methods operates under slightly different congressional authority, 
issues under different processes, and warrants different standards of 
deference.34
The most formal interpretation or issuance from the IRS appears 
as a “regulation[] issued pursuant to a specific directive.”35 
Throughout the tax code, Congress has inserted various “specific 
congressional instructions regarding rulemaking.”36 Under these 
specific directives, the IRS issues regulations to guide the 
administration of the tax code. These specific regulations issue with 
full notice-and-comment procedures as required for rule making 
under the Administrative Procedures Act.37 Courts generally give 
2003) (stating that the court does give deference to revenue rulings, but not stating to what 
degree).  
 32. Limited, Inc. v. Comm’r, 286 F.3d 324, 337 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Bankers Life & 
Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
 33. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978. 
 34. See id. at 978 (“Each of these categories often receives different deference from the 
courts.”). See generally Coverdale, supra note 7, at 39 (arguing that after Mead and Christensen 
these should receive different deference standards); Coverdale, supra note 14, at 35 (arguing 
that even under Chevron, the various IRS legal interpretations should receive differing levels of 
deference); Galler, supra note 2, at 844 (arguing that revenue rulings should receive no 
deference, as distinguished from specific or even general authority regulations). 
 35. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978; see also Coverdale, supra note 7, at 66–
76. 
 36. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978. Professor Coverdale surmises that 
[t]he Internal Revenue Code contains more than 1000 specific grants of regulatory 
authority. Many of these concern procedural matters such as the manner of making 
various elections open to taxpayers. More than 250 others authorize the Secretary of 
the Treasury to prescribe appropriate regulations to achieve the purposes of specific 
provisions, or to prevent avoidance of certain statutory provisions. A sizeable 
number authorize the Secretary to establish tax policy in areas where Congress was 
unable or unwilling to establish policy by statute.  
Coverdale, supra note 7, at 66. 
 37. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978; Coverdale, supra note 7, at 67; Galler, 
supra note 2, at 842; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000). The Administrative Procedure Act 
provides the following: 
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal 
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or 
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these regulations complete deference unless they are unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or capricious.38 
The IRS also issues regulations under a general grant of authority 
by Congress.39 Congress has provided that the IRS has authority to 
issue regulations pursuant to its power to “prescribe all needful rules 
and regulations.”40 Unlike specific regulations, these general directive 
regulations do not necessarily require full notice and comment for 
issuance, although the IRS generally follows such formal APA 
processes.41 General regulations usually receive a high level of 
deference, akin to specific regulations, although the exact amount of 
deference accorded them is not firmly established.42 
otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall 
include— 
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making 
proceedings; 
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and 
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the 
subjects and issues involved. 
Id. 
 38. Before Mead, there was a push for providing Chevron deference to these regulations. 
See Coverdale, supra note 14 at 53. Even after Mead and Christensen, courts are likely to give 
regulations under a specific congressional directive full Chevron deference, as they clearly carry 
the force of law. See Coverdale, supra note 7, at 77–78 (explaining that courts generally gave 
Chevron deference during the Chevron era and arguing under Mead they should have Chevron 
deference as well); Coverdale, supra note 14, at 53. 
 39. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978; Coverdale, supra note 7, at 65–68. 
 40. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (West 2004); see also Coverdale, supra note 7, at 67. 
(a) Authorization.—Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to 
any person other than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the 
Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this 
title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any 
alteration of law in relation to internal revenue. 
I.R.C. § 7805(a). 
 41. Coverdale, supra note 7, at 67 (“The Treasury claims that it is not required to use 
notice-and-comment procedure for promulgating general authority regulations because they 
qualify for the interpretive rule exception of section 553(b)(A) of the Administrative Procedure 
Act. Nonetheless, the Treasury uses notice and comment for all final general authority 
regulations. They are published in the Federal Register and subsequently codified in the Code 
of Federal Regulations.” (citing Receipt of Multiple Notices With Respect to Incorrect 
Taxpayer Identification Numbers, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,579, 44,580-81 (proposed July 3, 2002))); 
see also Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978 (citing First Chi. NBD Corp. v. Comm’r, 
135 F.3d 457 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
 42. Coverdale, supra note 7, at 75–76 (suggesting that under “classic tax deference 
standards” courts would defer to these general authority regulations, even if court inquiries 
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Additionally, the IRS issues letter rulings to private parties. While 
specific and general directives, as well as revenue rulings, have 
general applicability to a variety of parties, “letter rulings apply only 
to the parties who specifically request them.”43 These letter rulings 
may not be used as precedent by either courts or the IRS and receive 
little or no deference.44
If the four IRS formats were viewed in a continuum, revenue 
rulings would be positioned between general authority regulations 
and letter rulings, though revenue rulings are much more akin to 
general regulations.45 While revenue rulings “do not have the force 
and effect of Treasury Department regulations,”46 they are “an 
official interpretation by the Service which has been published in the 
Internal Revenue Bulletin.”47 Additionally, they “provide precedents 
to be used in the disposition of other cases, and may be cited and 
relied upon for that purpose.”48 Thus, revenue rulings are 
“authoritative and binding on the IRS.”49 Though not regulations, 
these rulings “seem similar to regulations” and often provide the 
IRS’s official stance and interpretation of the law that it has been 
assigned to administer.50
Basically, revenue rulings are legal interpretations of the tax 
code—that is, the sole concern of revenue rulings is legal 
interpretation or exposition of tax laws.51 Revenue rulings “are 
were more searching, but arguing that under Christensen and Mead, general authority 
regulations should not receive full Chevron deference). 
 43. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978. 
 44. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6110-7(b) (2004) (“A written determination may not be used or 
cited as precedent . . . .”); SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 3.03[1] (“[A] letter ruling’s legal 
conclusions are statutorily prohibited from being used as precedent.”); see also Bankers Life & 
Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978. 
 45. Limited, Inc. v. Comm’r, 286 F.3d 324, 337 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Revenue rulings do 
not apply as broadly as regulations, nor as narrowly as private letter rulings.”); Bankers Life & 
Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978 (“In the middle, between letter rulings and specific authority 
regulations, are general authority regulations and revenue rulings.”). 
 46. Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814. 
 47. 26 C.F.R. §601.201(a)(6) (2002); see also Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814; 
SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 3.03[1]. 
 48. Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814; SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 3.03[1]. 
 49. Limited, Inc., 286 F.3d at 337 (citing Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978). 
 50. SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 3.03[1]. 
 51. Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814. Revenue rulings are defined as “an official 
interpretation by the Service of the internal revenue laws and related statutes, treaties, and 
regulations.” Id. (emphasis added). Also, Revenue Procedure 89-14, 6.01(4) explains that the 
 
3MORRIS.FIN 11/18/2005  1:36 PM 
999] Substantially Deferring to Revenue Rulings After Mead 
 1009 
  
typically the IRS’s response to a hypothetical situation.”52 The IRS 
considers how the law applies to hypothetical facts or situations and 
produces a reasoned judgment concerning the proper outcome.53 In 
these rulings the IRS usually provides “a simplified set of facts, . . . 
summarize[s] the applicable legal provisions, . . . set[s] forth the 
holdings of leading cases” and “present[s] the Internal Revenue 
Service’s position on how the law applies to the facts.”54 These 
“[r]evenue rulings arise from various sources, including rulings to 
taxpayers, technical advice to district offices, court decisions, 
suggestions from tax practitioner groups, publications, etc.”55
The issuance of revenue rulings is highly centralized, involving 
various levels of review. Only the national office issues revenue 
rulings.56 The Association Chief Counsel and Assistant Commissioner 
“are responsible for the preparation and appropriate referral for 
publication of revenue rulings reflecting interpretations of 
substantive tax law.”57 Specifically, “[t]he Internal Revenue Service 
Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Technical) drafts Revenue 
Rulings” after which various officers review each ruling until the 
Chief Counsel, Commissioner, and Treasury Department review and 
approve of them.58 Ultimately, the “same level of the IRS and the 
Cumulative Bulletin, in which revenue rulings appear, answers “substantive tax law[]” issues 
except “[d]etermination[] of fact rather than interpretations of law.” Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 
C.B. 814; see also SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 3.03[1] (stating that revenue rulings explain 
“how the tax law applies to a specific set of facts”). 
 52. Limited, Inc., 286 F.3d at 337. 
 53. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978; SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 3.03[2]. 
 54. Coverdale, supra note 7, at 70.  
 55. Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814; see also SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 3.03[2]; 
Galler, supra note 2, at 845. 
 56. 26 CFR §601.201(a)(6). 
 57. Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814. 
 58. Coverdale, supra note 14, at 79 (citing MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE ¶ 3.03[2][a] (2d ed. 1991)); Galler, supra note 2, at 847–48 & nn.44–45). 
Saltzman explains the basic process for issuing revenue rulings: 
1. A project is assigned to an attorney in the appropriate Division in the office of the 
Associate Chief Counsel (Technical). 
2. After research, a draft ruling is prepared in the prescribed format, along with a 
Background Information Note (BIN). 
3. The draft is given an in-depth review at the Branch level. This review can be 
performed by the Branch Chief, the Senior Technical Advisor, or the Assistant to 
the Branch Chief. 
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Treasury Department” that reviews “Treasury regulations” also 
writes and reviews revenue rulings.59
The current practice of publishing revenue rulings came “in 
response to criticism from Congress and private practitioners.”60 
Critics had argued that by not publishing revenue rulings, the IRS 
bred “favoritism,” “protected . . . influence,” and disadvantaged 
taxpayers who entered into disputes with the IRS.61 Thus, in 1953, 
the IRS instituted a policy of publishing these rulings. They 
originally had three purposes: to “inform field personnel of 
precedents or guiding positions,” to “provide a permanent, indexed 
reference to IRS positions,” and to “enable the public to review 
interagency communications that the IRS uses as precedents or 
guides.”62 Currently, the IRS publishes revenue rulings for the 
purpose of 
promot[ing] correct and uniform application of the tax laws by 
Internal Revenue Service employees and . . . assist[ing] taxpayers in 
attaining maximum voluntary compliance by informing Service 
personnel and the public of National Office interpretations of the 
internal revenue laws, related statutes, treaties, regulations, and 
statements of Service procedures affecting the rights and duties of 
taxpayers.63
Ultimately, revenue rulings are official, though more informal, 
legal interpretations by the IRS. They provide the IRS’s official 
stance on interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code and IRS 
4. The ruling is reviewed by the Associate Chief Counsel (Litigation) to determine 
whether the position is consistent with the Service’s litigating position in pending 
cases. 
5. The ruling is scheduled for Assistant Counsel Review, where it undergoes its 
strongest scrutiny. 
6. The ruling is simultaneously reviewed by the Associate Chief Counsel (Technical) 
and the Chief Counsel and receives approval. 
7. The proposed ruling is simultaneously reviewed by the Commissioner and by the 
Treasury. 
8. The ruling is published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. 
SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 3.03[2][a]. 
 59. Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 60. Galler, supra note 2, at 845 (citing Norman A. Sugarman, Federal Tax Rulings 
Procedure, 10 TAX L. REV. 1, 37 (1954)).
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 845–46 (citing Rev. Rul. 2, 1953-1 C.B. 484). 
 63. 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (1987); see also Galler, supra note 2, at 846. 
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regulations. Additionally, the format of these rulings allows the IRS 
to issue them expeditiously and efficiently for the benefit of the 
Service and taxpayers. While they result from various layers of review, 
they are not burdened by the time consuming nature of more formal 
rulemaking procedures.  
III. DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY APPLICATIONS OF 
LAW AND SPECIFICALLY TO IRS REVENUE RULINGS 
The deference that courts give agency legal interpretations has 
evolved over the last few decades. Prior to the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., the amount of deference a court gave an agency’s legal 
interpretation varied depending on the statute the agency was 
interpreting.64 In Chevron, the Court announced a general position 
on deferring to an agency’s legal interpretation—when confronted 
with an ambiguous or silent statute on a particular issue, courts 
should defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute 
the agency administers.65 Only fifteen years after Chevron, the Court 
altered its stance yet again in Christensen v. Harris County 66 and 
United States v. Mead, Corp.67 by allowing courts to give Chevron-
level deference to agency interpretations only when Congress 
intended agency interpretations to have the force of law.  
Although the deference courts gave IRS revenue rulings 
increased or decreased somewhat with the ebb and flow of deference 
afforded agencies, courts typically erred on the side of giving revenue 
rulings substantial deference. The Court’s decisions in Christensen 
and Mead, however, threaten the traditional deference accorded 
revenue rulings by changing the baseline requirements for substantial 
deference. Although the Supreme Court has not specified what level 
of deference revenue rulings merit, lower courts and commentators 
have generally found that while revenue rulings do not qualify for 
Chevron deference, they may qualify for Skidmore’s respect. Under 
 64. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 13, § 3.1, at 107–09 (explaining the inadequate 
state of the law before the Court’s decision in Chevron); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516. 
 65. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 66. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 67. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
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Skidmore courts attribute deference to agency interpretations of law 
to the extent that the interpretation is persuasive.68 The amount of 
deference courts should attribute to revenue rulings under Skidmore, 
however, remains vague and uncertain, and essentially robs them of 
actual deference. 
Part A lays out the deference courts gave revenue rulings in the 
pre-Chevron era. Part B explains the Chevron case and the deference 
generally afforded administrative agency applications of law under it, 
followed by a short explanation of the deference revenue rulings 
received under Chevron. Part C details the Court’s recent 
pronouncements in Christensen and Mead and the resurrection of 
Skidmore. Part D outlines the deference that courts of appeals and 
district courts have afforded revenue rulings after Christensen and 
Mead. Ultimately, the Court has made several alterations in how, 
when, and to what degree courts defer to administrative 
interpretations of law on particular issues—trends that have guided 
the amount of deference courts generally afforded revenue rulings. 
In the end, the Court’s recent decisions, as lower courts have applied 
them, have facially robbed revenue rulings of any actual deference 
they may have once enjoyed. 
A. Pre-Chevron Treatment of Revenue Rulings 
Prior to the Court’s pronouncement of general deference to 
administrative interpretations of law in Chevron, courts accorded 
various degrees of deference to revenue rulings. During this era, 
almost every federal circuit had “issued contradictory opinions 
regarding the weight of revenue rulings.”69 Some decisions 
attributed great weight to revenue rulings as dispositive to the 
determination of the case.70 In other decisions, courts merely 
accorded revenue rulings “weight” and thus closely examined those 
rulings.71 Some courts simply relied on revenue rulings as a means to 
 68. Mead, 533 U.S. at 235; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944). 
 69. Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent 
Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1062 (1995). 
 70. See, e.g., Comm’r v. O. Liquidating Corp., 292 F.2d 225, 230–31 (3d Cir. 1961). 
 71. See, e.g., Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1979). 
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assist in the interpretation of the relevant statutory provision.72 Other 
courts attributed no weight to revenue rulings.73 The Tax Court, in 
particular, has consistently stated that revenue rulings deserve no 
deference from courts as they merely represent the litigating position 
of the IRS.74
Ultimately, court deference to revenue rulings before the 
Chevron era was inconsistent at best.75 Part of the problem arose 
from the nature of revenue rulings—they are the official, yet 
informal, application of tax law provided by the agency charged with 
the enforcement and administration of taxes. While the level of 
deference courts attributed revenue rulings remained somewhat 
uncertain, a trend emerged after the Court’s opinion in Chevron 
 72. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. United States, 656 F.2d 659, 671 n.20 (Ct. Cl. 1981) 
(explaining that revenue rulings are not binding but do influence the course of a decision). 
 73. See, e.g., Stubbs, Overbeck & Assocs., v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146–47 
(5th Cir. 1971) (explaining that revenue rulings are merely the opinions of a lawyer and 
therefore have the same influence as any opinion by a lawyer); Miller v. Comm’r, 327 F.2d 
846, 850 (2d Cir. 1964); Kaiser v. United States, 262 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1958) (citing 
United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 1951) (suggesting that revenue rulings 
represent only the opinion of a lawyer)). 
 74. Galler, supra note 70, at 1037–39 & n.57 (collecting cases). 
 75. After reviewing the historical practice of according revenue rulings various deference 
levels, some commentators have concluded that courts merely used revenue rulings 
alternatively between the “decision-making and decision-justifying functions of judging.” See 
Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The Unproven Case of Increased Judicial 
Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 643 (1996). Essentially, deference as a 
judicial doctrine was an “inherently indeterminate and manipulable doctrine,” and therefore 
courts could use or not use rulings in a variety of ways “to justify decisions reached on the 
basis” of other factors. Id. at 658–59 (discussing the theories of Sidney A. Shapiro, Richard E. 
Levy, and Richard J. Pierce, Jr.); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial 
Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 
1051 (1995); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 
DUKE L.J. 1110 (1995). Yet other scholars have argued that courts were fairly consistent in 
not attributing deference to revenue rulings before the Court’s decision in Chevron. These 
scholars, however, merely looked at the position of the Tax Court, Galler, supra note 2, at 
849–50, and later changed course to suggest that the level of deference accorded revenue 
rulings has been far from consistent or clear during this time. See Galler, supra note 70, at 
1062 & n.124 (citing the same precedent in an earlier article but coming to the conclusion 
that rather than suggesting consistency, the cases before Chevron generally suggest 
inconsistency, contradiction, or ambiguity). See also Caron, supra, for a rather scathing attack 
on Professor Galler’s conclusions concerning the consistency of courts’ deference to revenue 
rulings. Professor Caron explains that the real reason for the differing positions on deference 
arises from the way in which courts use deference as a judicial tool as opposed to an actual 
doctrine. See Caron, supra. 
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under which courts typically deferred to revenue rulings to a 
substantial degree. 
B. Chevron 
Prior to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,76 courts accorded deference to administrative agencies 
primarily on a statute by statute basis77 and generally only when it 
was clear from the statute or legislative history “that Congress 
intended to grant the agency broad authority to make policy.”78 The 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Chevron revolutionized the deference 
standard79 and stated clearly that courts should defer to agency 
interpretations of the agency’s governing statute when that statute is 
ambiguous or silent on a particular issue and when the agency’s 
construction of the governing statute is reasonable.80 In other words, 
courts should not substitute their own interpretation for an agency’s 
unless the agency’s interpretation was unreasonable or arbitrary or 
capricious.81 While some courts after Chevron treated revenue rulings 
with less deference than that accorded to other agency 
pronouncements under Chevron, most courts concluded that 
revenue rulings were entitled to actual and substantial deference as 
official interpretations by the IRS. 
1. The decision 
In Chevron, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and provided a general stance of 
deference to agency pronouncements that interpret the statute that 
 76. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 77. See Scalia, supra note 64, at 516; DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 13, § 3.1, at 107–09. 
 78. Coverdale, supra note 7, at 42–43 (citing NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 
111, 130–31 (1944)); see also Robert L. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges 
and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 106 (1944). 
 79. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 13, § 3.2 (explaining that Chevron marked a 
change from prior practice and “is one of the most important decisions in the history of 
administrative law”); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 739 (arguing that Chevron “relied 
upon a novel theory of implied delegation, rather than agency expertise”); Scalia, supra note 
64, at 512 (stating that Chevron is perhaps the “most important [decision] in the field of 
administrative law since Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC”). 
 80. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
 81. Id. 
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the agency is tasked with administering.82 According to the Court, 
“[t]he basic legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static 
judicial definition of the term ‘stationary source’ when it had decided 
that Congress itself had not commanded that definition.”83 
To assist lower courts in the future, the Court provided a two-
step analysis for deciding when a court should give deference to an 
agency’s interpretation “of the statute which it administers.”84 First, a 
court must determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”85 If the 
court determines that the statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue,” the court must, second, determine “whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”86
The crux of the Supreme Court’s decision rests on the idea that 
“[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a 
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the 
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left . . . 
by Congress.”87 Because gap-filling, in essence, represents 
 82. Id. at 842–45. 
 83. Id. at 842. 
 84. Id. Chevron’s analysis is affectionately referred to as the “two-step.” See DAVIS & 
PIERCE, supra note 13, at § 3.2, at 109–12; Coverdale, supra note 7, at 42 (explaining that 
Kenneth Starr dubbed the Chevron analysis the “Chevron ‘two-step’” (citing Kenneth W. 
Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 287–88 (1986))). 
 85. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 86. Id. at 843. The Court noted that this is completely different from the normal 
judicial function: “If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, 
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.” Id. 
 87. Id.; see also Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 742 (explaining that the thrust and 
importance of the Chevron decision was that it “relocated the basis for judicial deference from 
expertise to an implied delegation of lawmaking power”). Gaps left for administrative agencies 
to fill, according to the Court, develop either “implicitly or explicitly.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843. When Congress explicitly leaves “a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express 
delegation of authority to the agency” to explain the statute through regulation. Id. at 843–
44. Such explicit authority means that the agency’s interpretation by regulation receives 
“controlling weight” that cannot be set aside by a court unless “arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844. Cases in which the gap left for the agency is 
implicit require a slightly different standard: when Congress’s delegation is implicit, courts 
must defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of the statute so long as the 
interpretation is reasonable. Id. 
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congressional delegation to an agency to make policy, courts should 
respect the authority of agencies in this unique role and merely 
review agency interpretations to ensure that they are not 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. This view of an agency’s role 
led the Court to set forth a general stance of deference toward an 
administrative agency’s interpretation of the statute entrusted to that 
agency. When a statute is ambiguous on an issue, courts merely 
consider whether the agency’s interpretation was arbitrary or 
capricious if Congress explicitly delegated authority,88 or reasonable if 
Congress implicitly delegated power to the agency.89 Ultimately, 
Chevron represented a great equalization—rather than looking from 
statute to statute for signs of whether or how much deference is 
justified, courts should merely determine whether the statute is 
ambiguous and whether the agency reasonably resolved the issue. 
Underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron is an 
understanding of the proper roles of agencies and courts and a 
respect for the separation of powers. Thus, Chevron demands that 
judges “respect the legitimate policy choices made by” those who are 
politically accountable—agencies.90 While questions still remained 
after the Court’s decision,91 Chevron marked a shift toward generally 
 88. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 866. Justice Stevens observed the following: 
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the 
Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, 
but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an 
agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within 
the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s 
views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly 
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for 
this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the 
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or 
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the 
statute in light of everyday realities. 
Id. at 865–66. 
 91. While Chevron set forth a policy of deference, many aspects of the Court’s holding 
created avenues to avoid applying full Chevron deference. The most obvious is that complete 
deference is warranted only when Congress has not directly spoken to the issue. As Justice 
Scalia intimated, one of the largest battles over Chevron deference is rooted in whether a 
statute is ambiguous. See Scalia, supra note 64, at 520–21. Depending on the tools of statutory 
construction that one uses to interpret the statute, judges may find statutes ambiguous just as 
easily as unambiguous. Id. One of Justice Scalia’s main concerns rests on the judiciary 
employing tools of statutory construction that diverge from those employed in strictly 
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deferring to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous 
statutory issues. 
2. Revenue rulings under Chevron 
After Chevron, courts for the most part deferred to revenue 
rulings on ambiguous issues arising from the tax code. Although the 
practice of substantially deferring to revenue rulings followed the 
general trend established by Chevron, courts did not necessarily 
attribute such deference to Chevron or strictly follow Chevron’s 
dictates. Many courts merely worked with preexisting precedent 
concerning revenue rulings. These courts almost always deferred to 
the revenue rulings, but they did not necessarily state that Chevron 
controlled the inquiry.92 This trend, in some ways, created a dual line 
construing a statute. That is, Justice Scalia sees immense danger in judges using legislative 
history to impeach the plain meaning of a statute. A judge may use legislative history to 
determine that a statute is not ambiguous, or is ambiguous, depending on whether the judge 
wants to provide or not provide deference to the agency. Id. Generally, Justice Scalia sees the 
evil of legislative history in allowing judges to find ambiguity more often, especially when the 
statute is fairly plain on its face. Id. at 521. 
Another issue arising from Chevron was which formats encapsulating an administrative 
agency’s interpretation warranted deference and which did not. Compare DAVIS & PIERCE, 
supra note 13, § 3.5 at 119 (arguing that Chevron should only apply to legislative rules and 
adjudications and not “less formal formats” (citing Robert Anthony, Which Agency 
Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990))), with United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 252 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
Chevron deference does not rest on the formality of the pronouncements, and relying on 
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 263 (1995), in 
which the Court unanimously decided to defer to a private letter ruling because “it set forth 
the official position of the Comptroller of the Currency”), and Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31 
(stating that while Chevron deference has generally gone to regulations derived from notice-
and-comment procedures, it has also gone to informal pronouncements as well). 
 92. The prime example of this arose in the Second Circuit. In a series of cases, courts 
merely cited existing precedent that gave revenue rulings substantial weight—no discussion of 
Chevron occurred specifically or as a guiding principle. Many of the cases cited by the Second 
Circuit were decided prior to the Court’s decision in Chevron. See Weisbart v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 222 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2000), which cited Texasgulf, Inc. v. Comm’r, 172 F.3d 
209, 217 (2d Cir. 1999), which looked to Gillespie v. United States, 23 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 
1994), which looked to Salomon, Inc. v. United States, 976 F.3d 837, 841 (2d Cir. 1992), and 
Amato v. Western Union Int’l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1411 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing cases from 
1982 and 1979 for the proposition that revenue rulings were entitled to great deference and 
carried “the force of legal precedents”). 
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of authority93—courts might look to Chevron or to preexisting 
authority.94 Whether they looked to Chevron or their own precedent, 
most courts still gave Chevron-like deference to revenue rulings 
during this period. 
When firmly confronted with how much deference to accord 
revenue rulings, most courts in the Chevron era determined that they 
should substantially defer to the rulings. Almost every circuit to 
consider the matter gave heightened deference to revenue rulings.95 
Some courts emphasized the fact that revenue rulings were the 
embodiment of the IRS’s official position—holding that they receive 
“great deference,” carry the force of law, and would not be 
overturned unless “unreasonable or inconsistent with the Internal 
Revenue Code.”96 Other courts gave considerable weight to rulings 
and would provide deference unless the ruling conflicted with the 
 93. See Coverdale, supra note 7, at 77 (explaining that during the Chevron era there 
were two lines of authority that courts might look to, Chevron and “classic tax deference 
standards”). 
 94. One possible reason lower courts avoided a discussion of Chevron in determining 
the deference owed to revenue rulings is the Supreme Court’s complicity in avoiding the issue 
in two post-Chevron opinions. In Davis v. United States, the Court explained that “an agency’s 
interpretations and practices [receive] considerable weight where they involve the 
contemporaneous construction of a statute and where they have been in long use.” 495 U.S. 
472, 484 (1990); see also Telecom USA, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1068, 1073 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (explaining that “Davis did not . . . address how [its] standard compared to the 
relatively high level of deference applicable to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes 
under Chevron”). Instead of looking to Chevron in determining the relevant deference, the 
Court mentioned that “the Service’s interpretive rulings do not have the force and effect of 
regulations,” Davis, 495 U.S. at 484, but found it “sufficient to decide th[e] case [on the 
basis] that the Service’s longstanding interpretation is both consistent with the statutory 
language and fully implements Congress’ apparent purpose in adopting it.” Id. at 485. 
Similarly, and with less discussion or care, the Court in United States v. Thompson/Center Arms 
Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992), neutrally stated that “[e]ven if [revenue rulings] were entitled to 
deference, neither of the rulings goes to the narrow question presented here.” Id. at 518 n.9. 
Thus the Court merely compounded the issue and, by omission, provided several ways in Davis 
to give deference to revenue rulings while leaving the question unanswered.  
 95. See, e.g., Weisbart v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 222 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Telecom USA, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1068, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Bankers Life 
and Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 1998); Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese 
Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1145 (3d Cir. 1993); Foil v. Comm’r, 920 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 
1990). 
 96. Weisbart, 222 F.3d at 98 (citing Texasgulf, Inc. v. Comm’r, 172 F.3d 209, 217 (2d 
Cir. 1999); Gillespie v. United States, 23 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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statute, the legislative history, or was otherwise unreasonable.97 These 
courts essentially provided a level of deference similar to that in 
Chevron, even though they may have looked to legislative history to 
determine whether a ruling was inconsistent with law.  
On the other hand, a few courts gave revenue rulings the “lowest 
level of deference.”98 Here rulings were accorded “respectful 
consideration.”99 Lastly, certain courts presumed that revenue rulings 
warranted a level of deference but refrained from deciding the exact 
amount.100 Ultimately, however, “the Supreme Court and virtually all 
of the circuits . . . indicated that revenue rulings [were] entitled to 
some degree of deference” during the Chevron era.101 While the 
decisions that attributed great deference to revenue rulings 
resembled the same deference standard articulated in Chevron,102 
certain formulations in these decisions differed from a strict Chevron 
analysis. 
C. Christensen and Mead 
The Supreme Court decided Chevron in 1984, arguably altering 
the course of how, or when, courts should defer to administrative 
agencies. Between 2000 and 2001, the Court changed direction yet 
again in two decisions, Christensen v. Harris County103 and United 
States v. Mead Corp.104 While the implications of the Court’s 
decisions in these two cases may not yet be entirely clear, the 
decisions clearly mark a rather stark shift in the Court’s position on 
 97. See, e.g., Gillis, 4 F.3d at 1145; Kimberley-Clark Tissue Co. v. United States, 1997 
WL 127986, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 98. Bankers Life, 142 F.3d at 978 (citing First Chicago NBD Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 
F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 1998) for the understanding that “revenue rulings deserve ‘some 
weight,’ and are ‘entitled to respectful consideration, but not to the deference that the Chevron 
doctrine requires in its domain’” (citations omitted)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Telecom USA, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1068, 1073–74 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (“We need not announce a precise calibration here . . . . [U]tilizing even a minimal level 
of deference . . . is sufficient to decide this case.”). 
 101. Id. at 1073 & n.4. 
 102. Compare supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text, with supra notes 98–101 and 
accompanying text. 
 103. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 104. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
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when and how to defer to administrative interpretations.105 
Consequently, Christensen and Mead have ostensibly resulted in yet 
another change in the treatment that revenue rulings receive from 
courts.  
Courts generally deferred to revenue rulings under Chevron as 
long as the rulings were reasonable. After Christensen and Mead, 
however, courts have minimized, if not eliminated, the level of 
deference accorded revenue rulings. Facially, these recent decisions 
replace actual deference with mere respect, essentially removing any 
actual deference accorded revenue rulings. In the wake of these 
decisions, courts and commentators have generally concluded that 
rulings deserve some deference—Skidmore deference. This deference 
standard, however, leaves revenue rulings in a state of flux and 
arguably without any real deference. 
1. The decisions 
Beginning with Christensen v. Harris County, the Court 
intimated a change in course concerning when Chevron deference 
applied to an administrative agency’s interpretation of law.106 In 
Christensen, the Supreme Court considered whether Harris County 
could require “its employees to schedule time off in order to reduce 
the amount of accrued compensatory time.”107 Christensen and the 
United States asked the Court to defer to a Department of Labor 
opinion letter, “which [took] the position that an employer may 
compel the use of compensatory time only if the employee ha[d] 
agreed in advance to such a practice.”108 The Court interpreted the 
governing statute, concluded that the Fair Labor Standards Act 
 105. See Weaver, supra note 27, at 174; see also Coverdale, supra note 7, at 40 (stating 
that Christensen and Mead “revolutionized court deference to agency readings of statutes and 
of their own regulations”). 
 106. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; see also Weaver, supra note 27, at 173–74. 
 107. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), if 
“employees do use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer is obligated to pay 
cash compensation under certain circumstances.” Id. at 578. To stave off such potential 
consequences, “Harris County adopted a policy requiring its employees to schedule time off in 
order to reduce the amount of accrued compensatory time.” Id. The case arose out of a 
dispute over whether this policy is appropriate under the FLSA. Id. 
 108. Id. at 586. 
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“does not prohibit compelled use of compensatory time,”109 and 
refused to defer to the opinion letter. 
The Court reasoned that the opinion letter did not carry the 
force of law and therefore did not deserve full Chevron deference, 
even though the letter was eligible for a lesser degree of deference.110 
The Court noted that the opinion letter at issue was “not . . . arrived 
at after . . . a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.”111 Rather, as the Court explained, “Interpretations such 
as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy 
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of 
which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style 
deference.”112 The Court noted that opinion letters and more 
informal formats, which carry an agency’s statutory interpretation on 
an issue, “are ‘entitled to respect’ under our decision in Skidmore.”113 
With an eye still focused on the format of the agency’s issuance, the 
Court emphasized that Chevron does apply to agency regulations.114 
While the winds of change were clear in Christensen, the exact 
implications of the Court’s decision were not entirely apparent.115
The Supreme Court further elaborated upon the implications of 
its decision in Christensen a year later in United States v. Mead 
Corp.116 In Mead, the Court considered whether courts owed 
deference to a tariff-classification ruling letter that classified Mead’s 
day planners as bound diaries subject to tariff, as opposed to articles 
classified as “other” and therefore exempt from tariff.117 The Court 
concluded that the classification ruling letter did not warrant 
Chevron deference because no indication existed that “Congress 
intended such a ruling to carry the force of law.”118 Instead, the 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 587. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.; see also Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 747 (emphasizing that the key to 
Christensen and Mead is the formality or informality of the pronouncement). 
 114. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
 115. Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 746–47 (arguing that while Christensen intimated a 
change in focus, the result was only completed in Mead). 
 116. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 117. Id. at 221–24. 
 119. Id. at 221. 
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Court held that courts should accord such agency pronouncements 
Skidmore deference only.119
The Court’s holding fundamentally altered how and when courts 
should give Chevron deference to an agency declaration.120 Before 
Mead, courts gave Chevron deference to an administrative 
interpretation that “represented the authoritative position of the 
agency” regardless of the format or formality of the pronouncement 
so long as the two-part test was satisfied.121 After Mead, Chevron-type 
deference is arguably appropriate only when a court determines that 
Congress intended the agency’s pronouncement to “carry the force 
of law.”122 Adding another layer to the Chevron analysis, the Court 
now seems to require two new determinations before Chevron 
deference applies: an “administrative implementation of a particular 
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when [(1)] it 
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to 
make rules that carry the force of law, and [(2)] that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the existence 
of that authority.”123
The Court did note a few ways to determine whether Congress 
intended that an agency’s pronouncements carry the force of law. 
First, the Court emphasized that formal rulemaking procedures 
under the Administrative Procedure Act indicate congressional intent 
to delegate authority to the agency and, thus, carry the force of 
law.124 Notice-and-comment rulemaking, however, is not the only 
indicia of Chevron deference.125 Agencies may show Congress’s 
delegation of authority “in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 245–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Coverdale, supra note 7, at 40 (noting 
that Christensen and Mead “revolutionized” administrative law). But see Krotoszynski, supra 
note 13, at 755 (arguing that Christensen and Mead merely ratify Chevron’s departure from 
past practice). 
 121. Mead, 533 U.S. at 243, 245–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see DAVIS & PIERCE, 
supra note 13, § 3.5. Admittedly, this is a fairly contentious issue. However, a unanimous 
court agrees with one point—the Court has granted Chevron deference to both 
pronouncements arising from notice-and-comment procedures as well as less formal 
procedures. 
 122. Mead, 533 U.S. at 221. 
 123. Id. at 226–27; see also id. at 239, 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing this as the 
two-part test the Court set down in its decision). 
 124. Id. at 230. 
 125. Id. at 230–31. 
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to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by 
some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.”126 
While the Court did not specifically address what may qualify for 
“comparable congressional intent,” it left the possibility of qualifying 
for Chevron deference through a means other than formal APA 
procedures. In point of fact, the Court reemphasized its discussion of 
explicit and implicit delegation under Chevron. That is, while 
Congress may expressly delegate authority to an agency to speak 
with the force of law, it may also leave a gap in the statute, which 
Congress implicitly intends for the administrative agency to fill.127 
Thus when “it is apparent from the agency’s generally conferred 
authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would 
expect the agency to speak with the force of law when it addresses 
ambiguity in the statute or fills space in the enacted law, . . . a 
reviewing court” may not dismiss or reject the agency’s 
interpretation as it exercises its “generally conferred authority.”128
Acknowledging that other procedures may qualify for Chevron-
level deference, the Court also explained that “[i]t is fair to assume 
generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the 
effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative 
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should 
underlie a pronouncement of such force.”129 The Court thus 
intimates that full APA procedures are not necessary, although a 
 126. Id. at 227. Justice Breyer recently emphasized this aspect of Mead in National Cable 
& Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
concurring).  
 127. Id. at 229. The Supreme Court noted that “in Chevron [the Court] recognized that 
Congress not only engages in express delegation of specific interpretative authority, but that 
‘[s]ometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit.’” Id. 
(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). 
 128. Id. The Supreme Court recognized that Congress may intend the agency to speak 
with the force of law even when “‘Congress did not actually have an intent’ as to a particular 
result.” Id. When Congress has implicitly delegated authority to an agency to speak with the 
force of law, courts may not reject an agency interpretation “simply because the agency’s 
chosen resolution seems unwise, ‘but is obliged to accept the agency’s position if Congress has 
not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.’” Id. 
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–46). Thus the Court reemphasized and upheld its holding 
in Chevron. 
 129. Id. at 230. The Court stated that “the overwhelming number of our cases applying 
Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal 
adjudication.” Id. at 230 & n.12; see also Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 737 (arguing that 
Christensen and Mead rest on a distinction between formal and informal pronouncements). 
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certain indicia of formality is expected. Even when an agency 
pronouncement lacks the force of law and therefore lacks Chevron 
deference, however, that pronouncement is still afforded some 
deference.130 The Court explained that another level of deference is 
appropriate for announcements that do not carry the force of law, 
such as opinion letters.131 Accordingly, the Court looked to an early 
Supreme Court decision—Skidmore v. Swift & Co.132
2. Resurrecting Skidmore 
In Mead, the Supreme Court explained that “Chevron did 
nothing to eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s 
interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form.”133 In 
Skidmore,134 the Court held that administrative interpretations 
“constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which 
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”135 
Accordingly, the level of deference given to such rulings or 
interpretations “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in 
[their] considerations, the validity of [their] reasoning, [their] 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
 130. Id. at 234–35. 
 131. Id. 
 132. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The Supreme Court in Mead actually structures its opinion to 
intimate that the baseline for deference to administrative applications of law on an issue is 
Skidmore’s invocation of respect, and anything more, i.e., Chevron deference, is the exception 
to the rule. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227–30. The Court does this by beginning its discussion of 
deference by looking to the basis for Skidmore and what has followed. See id. at 227–28. Then, 
and only then, does it turn to Chevron. See id. at 229. 
 133. 533 U.S. at 234. 
 134. The Court decided Skidmore long before the modern era of the administrative state. 
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., which was decided in 1944. 323 U.S. 134. In Skidmore, the 
Court confronted whether workers, such as firemen, who spent much of their time waiting in 
the service of their employer, should be entitled to count time waiting toward overtime pay 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 135–36. In deciding how best to proceed, the 
Court considered the amount of deference owed to the FLSA Administrator’s interpretation of 
law, which appeared in an Interpretive Bulletin. Id. at 137–38. No statutory provision 
explained the amount of deference due to the Administrator’s determinations, even though the 
Administrator was charged with various duties and powers “to inform himself of conditions” in 
employment. Id. at 139, 137. While the Administrator’s determination was an interpretation 
of the Act, it was not conclusive or binding. It was “not reached as a result of hearing adversary 
proceedings in which he finds facts from evidence and reaches conclusions of law” or any other 
formal proceeding. Id. at 139. 
 135. Id. at 140. 
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factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.”136 The reasons to accord agencies this deference rest on the 
fact that the agency’s “policies are made in pursuance of official 
duty” and based on “more specialized experience and broader 
investigations and information” than judges typically have.137 
Additionally, these interpretations typically “determine the policy 
which will guide [the agency’s] enforcement” of the statute.138 By 
resurrecting Skidmore, the Supreme Court may have substantially 
altered the course of attributing deference to administrative 
applications of law on an issue. 
In sum, after Mead essentially two levels of deference exist139—an 
agency pronouncement either carries the force of law and therefore 
engenders Chevron deference,140 or does not carry the force of law 
and garners only Skidmore deference. According to the Supreme 
Court, Skidmore deference means that an interpretation may “at least 
seek a respect proportional to its ‘power to persuade.’”141 One may 
claim Skidmore deference when Chevron is inapplicable, when the 
“regulatory scheme is highly detailed,” and when the administrative 
agency “can bring the benefit of specialized experience to bear on 
the subtle questions” raised in the case.142 The purpose behind 
providing Skidmore deference is that agencies have “specialized 
experience” and have greater availability to investigate and obtain 
information. Furthermore, there is great value in “uniformity in . . . 
administrative and judicial understandings of what national law 
requires.”143
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 139. 
 138. Id. at 139–40. 
 139. See Weaver, supra note 27, at 173–74 (arguing that Mead and Christensen 
“articulate[d] dual deference standards,” with “[s]ome administrative interpretations . . . 
judged under Chevron” and “[o]ther[s] judged under Skidmore”); Krotoszynski, supra note 
13, at 749–51 (arguing two deference standards exist after Mead: expertise under Skidmore and 
delegation under Chevron and Mead). 
 140. Professor Weaver argues that this is “actual deference.” See Weaver, supra note 27, 
at 174. 
 141. Skidmore, 533 U.S. at 235. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 234; see also Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 739–40 (arguing that Skidmore 
rests on expertise). 
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D. Current Lower Court Treatment of Revenue Rulings 
Christensen and Mead facially upset previous positions on 
whether revenue rulings receive Chevron deference and generally 
obfuscate the issue of deference. While not all circuit or district 
courts had decided that revenue rulings warranted Chevron 
deference, several courts had basically reached that conclusion.144 
However, after the Court’s recent pronouncements, most courts’ 
previous decisions on the issue were called into question.145 Now, 
instead of granting Chevron or Chevron-like deference, courts have 
determined that revenue rulings merit only Skidmore deference.  
Most courts that have directly addressed the issue have decided 
that revenue rulings are not entitled to Chevron deference, as they do 
not “carry the force of law.”146 In concluding that revenue rulings do 
not warrant Chevron deference, courts have looked to a couple of 
factors. The tariff rulings in Mead, according to one court, are 
analogous to revenue rulings. Mead’s conclusion that tariff rulings 
receive only Skidmore deference therefore apply equally to revenue 
rulings.147 Other courts rested their conclusion on the fact that 
 144. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 145. See, e.g., Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 347 F.3d 173, 180 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“[R]ecent Supreme Court decisions limiting the Chevron doctrine have called our earlier cases 
into question.”), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 37 (2004); Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 
5137(JGK), 2004 WL 2085528, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2004) (explaining that 
Christensen and Mead cast “some doubt as to whether revenue rulings are necessarily entitled 
to [Chevron] deference”); Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 984, 998 (N.D. 
Ohio 2004) (same). 
 146. See, e.g., O’Shaughnessy v. Comm’r, 332 F.3d 1125, 1130 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc., 347 F.3d at 181 (“[W]e conclude that Revenue Ruling[s] should not 
be accorded Chevron deference.”); Omohundro v. United States, 300 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th 
Cir. 2002); Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm’r, 251 F.3d 210, 214 (2001) (“We accord 
these [revenue] rulings Skidmore deference . . . .”); Am. Bankers Ins. Group, Inc. v. United 
States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1371–72 (S.D. Fla. 2004) rev’d, 408 F.3d 1328 (2005); Office 
Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (“[T]his Court will not accord Chevron deference to 
revenue ruling[s] . . . .”); see also Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (2004) 
(not resolving whether Chevron applies to revenue rulings, but explaining that “obviously some 
level of deference to the agency ruling is due,” and according the ruling Skidmore deference). 
 147. See, e.g., Omohundro, 300 F.3d at 1068 (“Mead involved a Customs Service tariff 
ruling, which is closely akin to an IRS revenue ruling. Given that the two types of agency 
rulings are analogous, we are required to apply Mead’s standard of review to an IRS revenue 
ruling.”). There are major differences between these types of rulings, differences the court did 
not apparently consider. For current purposes, the most glaring difference is the procedure and 
structure for issuing the pronouncements. See infra notes 221–227 and accompanying text. 
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revenue rulings are informal, and “the IRS does not claim for 
revenue rulings ‘the force and effect of Treasury Department 
regulations.’”148
While these courts have not accorded revenue rulings Chevron 
deference, they have held that revenue rulings are entitled to 
Skidmore deference.149 In explaining the deference given revenue 
rulings under Skidmore, these courts have employed the general 
verbal formulation for determining the deference due to more 
informal interpretations of law: the “level of deference” depends “on 
the Ruling’s ‘power to persuade,’ i.e., the validity and thoroughness 
of its reasoning and its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements.”150 
In the process of determining the deference accorded a ruling, 
however, some courts have walked through the Skidmore factors in a 
consistent, though unique way. Courts have looked into whether, in 
the ruling, the “IRS’s reasoning [was] valid,” and then whether the 
ruling was “consistent with later IRS pronouncements.”151 Other 
courts checked that the “interpretation [was] supported by the 
legislative history of the statute.”152 While their analysis is consistent 
with Skidmore’s formulation, these courts have not so much looked 
to persuasiveness as the end goal, as the Supreme Court and several 
lower courts have,153 but have acted as a check on the administrative 
agency—not to state what is right or wrong but to ensure that the 
agency’s actions are consistent with the law.154
Ultimately, from the initiation of deference to agency 
interpretations of law on an issue until today, the Court has taken a 
long and winding road, especially since its decision in Chevron. 
Revenue rulings, to some extent, have followed the ebb and flow of 
the Court’s tide of decisions. For most of this journey, courts have 
given revenue rulings substantial deference. The Court’s recent cases 
 148. Aeropquip-Vickers, Inc., 347 F.3d at 181. 
 149. See, e.g., Aeropquip-Vickers, Inc., 347 F.3d at 181; O’Shaughnessy, 332 F.3d at 1130; 
Omohundro, 300 F.3d at 1068; U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm’r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1142 
(7th Cir. 2001); Del Commercial Props., Inc., 251 F.3d at 214; Am. Express Co. v. United 
States, 262 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d. at 998. 
 150. Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 998. 
 151. Omohundro, 300 F.3d at 1068. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001). 
 154. Cf. Weaver, supra note 27, at 187. 
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on their face, however, rob any actual deference that rulings have 
traditionally received by merely providing them with respect.155 
 155.  Another avenue of deference has both confused courts and given an alternate route 
for according revenue rulings substantial deference. Only two months before deciding Mead, 
the Court issued its decision in United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. 532 U.S. 200 
(2001). In Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., the Court faced the question of what level of 
deference it should give the IRS’s revenue rulings. The Supreme Court determined, however, 
that it “need not decide whether Revenue Rulings themselves are entitled to deference.” Id. at 
220. Because the rulings at issue merely “reflect[ed] the agency’s longstanding interpretation 
of its own regulations,” they were entitled to substantial court deference. Id. (citing Thomas 
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)). Reaffirming prior precedent, the Court 
explained that “regulations and interpretations” that have continued for many years “without 
substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes” have essentially 
gained Congress’s approval and therefore “have the effect of law.” Id. (citing Cottage Sav. 
Ass’n. v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 561 (1991)). Here, the agency had consistently interpreted 
“its own 61-year-old regulation implementing a 62-year-old statute.” Id. In the end, the Court 
left open the question of deference to revenue rulings, while suggesting other avenues down 
which IRS interpretations within revenue rulings may receive deference.  
Many courts have infused the Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. decision into their 
determination of whether a ruling requires deference after Mead. Specifically, some courts have 
looked for long-standing interpretations as the lynchpin for gauging the deference owed to 
revenue rulings. See, e.g., Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (2004); Aeroquip-
Vickers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 347 F.3d 173, 182 (6th Cir. 2003). When the interpretation is not 
long-standing, or even if not as long-standing as the ruling in Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 
courts simply deny that deference is due. O’Shaughnessy v. Comm’r, 332 F.3d 1125, 1130 
(8th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that revenue rulings are entitled to Skidmore deference, but 
that the Supreme Court has not addressed the deference due revenue rulings, and since the 
revenue ruling at issue “does not reflect a similarly longstanding or consistent interpretation of 
an ‘unamended or substantially reenacted statute,’” no deference is due). This approach is 
mistaken. 
In Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., the Court reinvigorated two principles aside from the 
Mead analysis. Specifically, the Court relied on a line of cases springing from Bowles v. Seminole 
Rock & Sand. Co. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). This line of cases states that an agency’s 
“longstanding interpretation of its own regulations” warrants deference. Cleveland Indians 
Baseball Co., 532 U.S. at 220; see Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512. Professor 
Coverdale seems to suggest that the Court in Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. did not as clearly 
as it would seem reaffirm the principle that courts “must give substantial deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations,” which relied on Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 
U.S. at 512. See Coverdale, supra note 7, at 90–91 (arguing that although the Court in 
Cleveland Indians did cite to Thomas Jefferson Univ., it did not invoke Seminole Rock in 
concluding as it did). Although he agrees that the Court invoked the specter of this line of 
cases, he argues ultimately that the Court did not rest on Seminole Rock. One interesting aspect 
of Professor Coverdale’s argument that the Court did not look to Seminole Rock is that he 
includes no discussion of how it is that by citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. the Court avoided this 
line of precedent. While the Court, admittedly, did not cite Seminole Rock, it did tap into the 
line of cases that are built on Seminole Rock’s foundation. See Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. 
at 512. There are numerous occasions in which the Court may use the reasoning or authority 
of an “initial” case without citing that case, although it does cite cases that have continued to 
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However, while courts have taken certain cues from the Court’s 
Mead opinion, revenue rulings should receive substantial deference 
under a proper understanding of Mead as requiring an adequate 
procedure for issuing agency pronouncements. 
IV. ACCORDING SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE TO 
REVENUE RULINGS AFTER MEAD 
Revenue rulings have, with notable exceptions,156 obtained 
substantial judicial deference throughout the course of the Supreme 
Court’s evolving administrative deference jurisprudence.157 However, 
the Court’s unclear opinion in Mead,158 which purported to clarify 
when Chevron deference is warranted, has potentially eliminated the 
substantial deference courts should accord revenue rulings. The 
Mead Court appears to require an enigmatic search for congressional 
intent to give an agency the power to speak with the force of law, 
reaffirm prior reasoning. It is unclear how the lack of a case name in an opinion means that 
other cases cited for the same proposition somehow avoid bringing the original case into play. 
Nonetheless, when an agency interprets its own regulation, such an interpretation receives 
“controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Id. 
(citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150–51 
(1991)). 
Alternatively, the Court looked to a series of cases under which “regulations and 
interpretations” that have continued for long periods of time without change and that relate to 
a statute that Congress has “amended” or essentially “reenacted” are treated as having 
“congressional approval and . . . the effect of law.” Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. at 
220 (citing Cottage Sav. Ass’n. v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 561 (1991)). 
While agency interpretations of its own regulations and the existence of long-standing 
interpretations provide distinct grounds for providing substantial deference to a revenue ruling, 
under these two principles courts do not necessarily defer to revenue ruling. They defer to the 
interpretations themselves. Thus, it may be a little disingenuous to say that a court defers to 
the revenue ruling under these analyses. Neither of these principles rest on the format in which 
the agency’s interpretation appears. Rather, each principle rests on solid principles for deferring 
to the interpretation itself, rather than the format, as would be the case if the inquiry consisted 
of determining whether the format of an interpretation signified the force of law. However, 
because revenue rulings frequently give form to these types of interpretations, these principles 
provide for two distinct means by which courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation 
unless the interpretation is unreasonable. 
 156. See supra notes 75, 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra notes 70–71, 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Adrian Vermeule, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit: Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 
347 (2003) (“[M]istakes are traceable to the flaws, fallacies, and confusions of the Mead 
decision itself. The blame for the Mead muddle, then, lies with the Supreme Court.”). 
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and an indication it has used that power before an agency 
interpretation may receive substantial deference. Employing this 
unclear standard, courts have determined that revenue rulings do not 
warrant Chevron deference.159 Instead, courts have held that revenue 
rulings may receive Skidmore’s respect,160 which is ultimately not 
deference at all.161 
Although after Mead courts and commentators have generally 
concluded revenue rulings deserve only Skidmore deference,162 these 
rulings should receive Chevron deference because they perfectly 
satisfy the type of procedure the Court considered “some other 
indication” that an agency interpretation should receive substantial 
deference. The inherent limits of and policies underlying revenue 
rulings further support giving them Chevron-level deference.  
Part A explains how courts applying Skidmore-type deference to 
revenue rulings rob them of any deference they generally received 
prior to Mead and still deserve. This Part also explains how courts 
have resisted removing deference from revenue rulings and illustrates 
the strain caused by attempting to ignore these IRS 
pronouncements. Part B argues that revenue rulings deserve Chevron 
deference after Mead because they result from a process that is 
sufficiently formal to deserve deference.  
A. Stripping Revenue Rulings of Any Deference with Skidmore 
Almost uniformly, courts have concluded that revenue rulings 
warrant only Skidmore deference after Mead.163 Looking to Mead’s 
statements concerning congressional intent, courts have denied 
Chevron deference to these less formal but official applications of 
revenue law. By giving revenue rulings only Skidmore deference, 
courts do not merely ratchet down the level of deference these 
announcements once received, they remove deference entirely. While 
only providing Skidmore respect to revenue rulings, courts have at 
the same time resisted the basic effect of giving rulings no deference 
whatever. They have thus struck an interesting middle ground that 
 159. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 161. See infra notes 167–70 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra note 149; see also Weaver, supra note 27, at 89–90. 
 163. See supra note 149. 
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illustrates the problem of providing mere respect but also resolves 
the issue improperly.  
Skidmore, as explained in Mead and employed by certain courts, 
is nothing more than a truism, an empty, hollow pronouncement 
that courts ought to follow expert reasoning that is persuasive. 
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Mead, briefly and rightly observed that 
“Justice Jackson’s eloquence notwithstanding, the rule of Skidmore 
deference is an empty truism and a trifling statement of the obvious: 
A judge should take into account the well-considered views of expert 
observers.”164 In Mead, the Court, after explaining that Chevron did 
nothing to alter the existence and continued force of Skidmore, 
emphasized that an interpretation that did not qualify for Chevron 
deference may “at least seek a respect proportional to its ‘power to 
persuade.’”165 In other words, an interpretation by an administrative 
agency “may surely claim the merit of its writer’s thoroughness, 
logic, and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other 
sources of weight.”166
While the Court identified characteristics that should engender 
respect, the emphasis on persuasiveness and merit of reasoning is not 
deference at all; rather, it is a means of finding support for one’s own 
conclusion. Following the guides, as they are laid out in Mead, does 
not ask or require a court to “defer” to an agency’s interpretation.167 
Rather, the inquiry merely approves of courts looking to an expert’s 
reasoning, or ability to explain an area of law in such a way so as to 
fit it within existing law. To illustrate, consider the plethora of law 
review articles that are logical, thorough, well-reasoned, that mesh 
well with prior interpretations, and carry various other indicia of 
weight—everything this Article does not. When a court cites to such 
 164. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 165. Id. at 235. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See, e.g., Richard W. Murphy, A “New” Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore 
Deference and Agency Interpretative Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3 & n.9 (2004) (stating 
that Skidmore “leaves the courts themselves in charge of determining (and adopting) the best 
available statutory meaning” (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s 
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 856 (2001))); Weaver, supra note 27, at 179 (“Chevron tells 
reviewing courts to be prepared to give ‘actual deference’ to agency interpretations . . . . By 
contrast, Skidmore tells courts that they should make the interpretative decision, and that they 
need only ‘consider’ an agency interpretation and give it the weight it deserves based on its 
persuasiveness.”). 
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articles, no one calls it deference, or even deferring to the author. 
Quite the contrary, such a move may call down claims of judges 
abdicating their duty to say what the law is.168 Looking to an expert’s 
reasoned opinion on the law, no matter how well it harmonizes with 
prior law, does not equal deference if what a court seeks is 
persuasiveness in its own conclusion. 
When courts of appeals, for example, decide a case, they may not 
merely look to controlling precedent, but may, in many cases, 
examine lower court opinions or positions. And, many times, courts 
of appeals may adopt or employ the reasoning of the lower courts in 
coming to a conclusion. This is not deference—courts of appeals do 
not defer to lower courts, although they may look for persuasiveness 
or clarity of various arguments. Additionally, courts may survey other 
circuits or districts, other states or forums, but this too is not 
deference169—it is judges considering well reasoned views in deriving 
the proper result. 
Essentially, courts under Skidmore simply perform their own 
investigation into the meaning of the statute at issue. They look only 
to the agency’s interpretation to determine whether it may persuade 
them otherwise—of course carrying all the indicia of persuasiveness, 
such as its reasoning, the expositor’s expertise, etc.170 Even if a court 
were to change course, or confirm its own reasoning through 
examination of the agency’s interpretation, this type of inquiry is not 
an attempt to determine whether to defer to the agency—it is the 
court’s own independent examination, guided by expert assistance. 
Perhaps recognizing this dilemma, a few courts have recently 
given revenue rulings Skidmore’s respect by name, while also 
resisting the implications of granting nothing to these 
 168. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). A fine line exists in 
the administrative field between deferring to agency interpretations of law and abdicating 
judicial responsibilities, especially after Chevron. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 13, § 3.3, at 
114–15 (addressing the friction between Marbury and Chevron). Professor Murphy argues that 
the Court’s decision in Mead exacerbates this dilemma. See generally Murphy, supra note 167. 
 169. See Am. Bankers Ins. Group, Inc. v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d. 1360, 1371 
(S.D. Fla. 2004) (acknowledging that decisions from another circuit are not binding but 
persuasive), rev’d, 408 F.3d 1328 (2005). While the court noted the likeness between 
Skidmore’s persuasiveness and nonbinding circuit persuasiveness, it did not couch the inquiry 
as one of deference. It merely looked at whether the reasoning persuaded one way or another. 
This suggests that there is an elimination of “deference” outside Chevron. 
 170. Weaver, supra note 27, at 174. 
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interpretations. These courts have, in lieu of simply looking for 
persuasiveness, attempted to provide a more deferential stance 
toward these rulings. In the D.C. Circuit, for example, one opinion 
merely states that the court “find[s] them persuasive” given the 
language of the statute at issue and Supreme Court precedent.171 The 
court then moves on to other aspects of the decision.172 By treating 
the ruling so cursorily, the court avoids the danger of Skidmore—that 
courts will supplant an agency’s view on the issue with their own 
interpretation of law.  
Additionally, other courts have created an interesting deference 
test under Skidmore specifically for revenue rulings. These courts 
look to whether the ruling is valid, consistent, and in accordance 
with the legislative history.173 This type of analysis, rather than 
providing an independent judicial inquiry, simply facially tries to 
ensure the agency acted correctly. These attempts to give rulings 
actual deference, instead of mere respect, illustrate the tension that 
emanates from trying to remove deference from these statements by 
the IRS as it administers the United States’ revenue scheme. While 
these courts have the right idea in mind, they have misstepped early 
in the deference dance. Rather than mere Skidmore respect, revenue 
rulings deserve substantial deference after Mead. 
B. Substantially Deferring to Revenue Rulings After Mead 
While Mead ostensibly clarified when courts accord Chevron 
deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation on a particular 
issue, the Court’s decision is far from clear.174 The opinion is replete 
with talismanic phrases such as “force and effect of law.”175 These 
phrases do not provide adequate guidance as to what courts should 
use in determining which administrative applications of a statute 
warrant the heightened Chevron deference.176 
 171. Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm’r, 251 F.3d 210, 214 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 172. See id. 
 173. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.   
 174. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of 
Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 470 (2002) (“Unfortunately, Mead 
provides incomplete guidance about how courts should undertake this inquiry.”). 
 175. See Mead, 533 U.S. 218 passim.  
 176. Weaver, supra note 27, at 175; see also infra note 180. 
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In the wake of Mead, various courts and commentators have 
looked specifically to the legislative history or other similar indicia of 
congressional desire to give an administrative issuance the force and 
effect of law.177 While valiant, these attempts alone strike in the 
wrong direction and create additional confusion.178 Rarely does 
Congress specifically provide that an administrative issuance carry the 
force of law,179 and, more to the point, Mead does not rest on 
congressional specificity alone. Rather Mead, at base, explains that 
Chevron deference is due when an administrative issuance is the 
result of a satisfactory, rather formal, fair, and deliberate 
procedure.180 Indeed, the proper view of Mead, as looking for an 
appropriate procedure to bestow Chevron deference on an agency 
pronouncement, suggests that revenue rulings deserve substantial 
deference. Revenue rulings result from precisely the procedure the 
Court in Mead considered “some other indication” that an 
interpretation deserves substantial deference.181 Moreover, the limits 
and policies underlying revenue rulings support granting these 
pronouncements substantial deference. 
 177. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 174 (explaining the novelty and importance of what 
Congress understands to carry the “force of law” and examining the history of Congress’s 
expression of intent); Weaver, supra note 27 (suggesting that the test is a hunt for 
congressional intent, though disagreeing with the propriety of such a test.); see also Fed. Nat’l 
Mortgage Ass’n. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1303, 1307–08 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that “the 
issue is . . . whether Congress intended for the IRS” to promulgate the issuance at hand). 
 178. Weaver, supra note 27, at 175. Professor Weaver aptly observes the difficulties with 
this approach: 
Congressional intent, to the extent that it can be reliably ascertained, is highly 
relevant to the question of whether courts should defer. But, Congress never 
explicitly states that agency interpretations should be given the “force of law” if 
articulated in particular formats, and it rarely gives implicit indications of its intent. 
As a result, by focusing on whether Congress intended to delegate “authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,” a question which is 
particularly difficult to answer or satisfactorily resolve, the Court diverts itself from 
more fundamental questions about why, and when, deference ought to be given. 
Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180.  See Professor Cass Sunstein’s recent article on this issue for a similar conclusion. 
Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. *5 (forthcoming 2006) (“The ‘force of law’ 
test is a crude way of determining whether Chevron deference is appropriate, and it introduces 
far too much complexity into the deference issue. The Court is apparently seeking to allow 
Chevron deference only or mostly when agency decisions have followed procedures that 
guarantee a kind of deliberation and reflectiveness.”). 
 181. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. 
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1. Mead: in search of a reliable process 
While the Court talks in terms of what Congress 
“contemplate[d],”182 “thought,”183 or “delegated,”184 Mead stands 
for the assurance that when an administrative issuance results from 
careful, deliberate, and formal procedures, courts should grant such 
an issuance Chevron deference. The Mead Court is clearly concerned 
with “congressional intent” or “congressional delegation,”185 though 
not in the way some believe. True, the Court examined the authority 
that the agency had and spoke in terms of Congress’s bestowal of 
power, but it was ultimately concerned with the formality of the 
procedure that produced the agency’s interpretation.  
Although the Court speaks of agency authority, it indicates that 
general authority accompanying formal procedures qualifies for 
Chevron-level deference. As an initial step, the Court looked to the 
congressional delegation of authority to the agency.186 While the 
Court purported to look at the “congressional delegation [of] 
authority to Customs to issue classification rulings with the force of 
law,”187 it did not restrict its analysis of this congressional authority 
to statements from Congress as to any specific form of 
pronouncement. In fact, the court looked to the larger grant of 
power to Customs.188 And while the Court found a minor indication 
that Congress at least contemplated the use of Custom’s rulings at 
issue in Mead,189 the structure of independent review over these 
classifications ultimately ran counter to the type of process for which 
Chevron deference is reserved.190 Ultimately, the analysis in Mead 
does not require specific indications of authority so much as a 
 182. Id. at 230. 
 183. Id. at 231. 
 184. Id. at 226–27 passim. 
 185. Id. passim. 
 186. See id. at 232–33. 
 187. Id. at 231–32. 
 188. Id. at 232 (“[I]t is true that the general rulemaking power conferred on Customs 
authorizes some regulation with the force of law, or ‘legal norms.’”). 
 189. Id. (“It is true as well that Congress had classification rulings in mind when it 
explicitly authorized, in a parenthetical, the issuance of ‘regulations establishing procedures for 
the issuance of binding rulings prior to the entry of the merchandise concerned.’”). 
 190. Id. at 232–33. 
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general grant of power to the agency. The Court’s real focus is on 
procedures.  
The Court does flatly state that Chevron deference is warranted 
“when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law.”191 However, it 
goes on to explain that the way in which to determine whether there 
is a congressional delegation rests on the procedure the agency 
employed in issuing its interpretation, and not simply the 
congressional record.192 Specifically, the Court equates congressional 
intent with process: “Delegation of such authority may be shown in 
a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication 
or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a 
comparable congressional intent.”193 Furthermore, the Court 
explained the basis for its ruling as resting on the conclusion that 
tariff classifications did not have to derive from sufficient authority 
nor appropriate procedures.194 Although the Court looked to the 
authority that the agency had, it was concerned ultimately with the 
procedure that produced the pronouncement for which deference 
was requested. 
The Court made its intent to focus on procedure in determining 
congressional delegation even more explicit when discussing the 
reasons for denying Chevron deference to the tariff ruling at issue. 
There, the Court examined the statute and looked for any statements 
of congressional intent.195 Determining that a grant of general 
authority is a sufficient bare minimum, the Court then looked at the 
process giving rise to the tariff rulings delivered by the Customs 
 191. Id. at 226–27. 
 192. Id. at 227; see also id. at 231 (suggesting two basic elements to look at, “[t]he 
authorization for classification rulings, and Customs’s practice in making them”). 
 193. Id. at 227. Again illustrating the connection between procedure and the intent that 
merits Chevron deference, the Court explained that it has “recognized a very good indicator of 
delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the 
process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference 
is claimed.” Id. at 229. 
 194. Id. at 231 (“The authorization for classification rulings, and Custom’s practice in 
making them, present a case far removed not only from notice-and-comment process, but from 
any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress ever thought of classification 
rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them here.” (emphasis added)). 
 195. See id. at 231–32. 
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Service.196 Specifically, the Court found that the rulings did not go 
through any notice-and-comment or other comparable procedure. 
Moreover, the Customs rulings did not have any precedential 
value—that is, their “binding character as a ruling stops short of 
third parties.”197 Lastly, the Court looked to the nature of these 
rulings and the fact that they issue from a variety of offices around 
the country and at a record pace: “to claim that classifications have 
legal force is to ignore the reality that 46 different Customs offices 
issue 10,000 to 15,000 of them each year.”198 Thus the process for 
issuing these classifications is not the type that ensures a reliable 
practice, with the proper “fairness and deliberation,” for which 
Chevron deference is warranted.199
In explaining how to determine when substantial deference is 
due, the Court listed three ways in which to show congressional 
delegation through procedure: 1) “adjudication,” 2) “notice-and-
comment rulemaking,” or (3) “some other indication of comparable 
congressional intent.”200 While ostensibly speaking of intent, the 
third category listed by the Court clearly contemplates a search for 
procedure. Using the Court’s own tools of construction, one 
understands that the most general term or phrase in a list is confined 
by the more specific terms or phrases.201 Thus, the Court’s focus on 
adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking suggests that the 
third category that will illustrate Congress’ intent to delegate 
authority to the agency and thereby grant Chevron deference is also a 
procedure or process. This conclusion is in accordance with the 
 196. Id. at 233 (turning to the process itself, the Court explained that “[i]t is difficult, in 
fact, to see in the agency practice itself any indication that Customs ever set out with a 
lawmaking pretense in mind when it undertook to make classifications like these” (emphasis 
added)). 
 197. Id. at 233. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. at 230. 
 200. Id. at 227. 
 201. See Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate, 537 U.S. 371 
(2003) (“[U]nder the established interpretative canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, 
where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are 
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the 
preceding specific words.” (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 
(2001); Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 255 (2000); Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 
303, 307 (1961))). 
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Court’s overall concern with procedure, evident throughout the 
Mead opinion, to determine when Chevron deference is due. 
Although the Court indicated various procedures that do not 
warrant Chevron deference, including one that allows for issuances 
from forty-six different offices, it did not specifically set down the 
type of appropriate procedure that would qualify as “some other 
indication of congressional intent.” The Court remained focused on 
adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking throughout its 
opinion in Mead,202 but did not limit the possible procedures 
through which agency pronouncements could receive Chevron’s 
deference. By including a category of potential procedures other 
than adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking in its list of 
ways to determine Chevron deference, the Court contemplated other 
processes for obtaining substantial deference.203 Openly the Court 
acknowledged that it had granted Chevron deference to cases that do 
not fall within the APA’s procedures or even procedures rising to 
that level of formality.204 “The fact that the tariff classification [in 
Mead] was not a product of such formal process does not alone . . . 
bar the application of Chevron.”205 
The real issue then is what types of procedures the Court 
contemplated as warranting Chevron-level deference absent 
adjudication or notice-and-comment rule making. As the Court 
never clearly expressed exactly what procedures fall within this third 
category, the procedures the Court considered insufficient shed light 
on this question. Clearly the Court’s anxiety over a practice under 
which forty-six different offices issue rulings bespeaks a concern for a 
centralized process with adequate supervision from higher 
authorities.206 The Court also noted in Christensen that it had 
 202. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (stating that there are various ways of showing 
delegation of authority, such as “adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking”); id. at 229 
(“[A] very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment [is] express congressional 
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudications that produces 
regulations or rulings”); id. at 230–31 & 230 n.12 (“[T]he overwhelming number of our cases 
applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or 
formal adjudication.”). 
 203. See id. at 227. 
 204. See id. at 230–31 (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. 
Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57, 263 (1995)). 
 205. Id. at 231. 
 206. See id. at 233. 
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concerns with pronouncements that were not issued through a 
structured procedure at all. Thus, mere “policy statements, agency 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines . . . do not warrant Chevron-
style deference.”207 Ultimately the Court did note that “relatively 
formal administrative procedure[s] tending to foster the fairness of 
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force” 
are the type of procedures that warrant Chevron’s deference.208 
In a notable case after Mead, the Court also indicated that on 
top of formal, fair, and deliberate procedures other considerations 
underlying a statutory scheme support providing Chevron deference. 
In Barnhart v. Walton,209 the Court affirmed that less formal 
procedures may still result in formats that deserve substantial 
deference.210 More to the point, the Court examined a variety of 
factors that argued in favor of providing substantial Chevron-level 
deference to an agency interpretation.211 This focus on additional 
factors suggests that if an interpretation that results from rather 
formal, fair, and deliberate procedures and is accompanied by other 
important factors, Chevron deference is due. Revenue rulings, in 
contrast to the tariffs in Mead, clearly derive from sufficient 
procedures to warrant substantial deference after Mead and are 
supported by various considerations that make Chevron deference 
appropriate. 
 207. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (citing Reno v. Koray, 
515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995)). While the Court’s look in Christensen to Reno raises an argument 
that the Court really only reserves Chevron for formal APA procedures, the Court’s inclusion of 
another category of procedures clearly counters such a stance. See Reno, 515 U.S. at 61 
(suggesting that guidelines less than “the rigors of the Administrative Procedur[e] Act” do not 
merit Chevron deference). 
 208. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230. 
 209. 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
 210. Id. at 221.  
 211. Id. at 222 (noting “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise 
of the Agency, the importance of the question to the administration of the statute, the 
complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the 
question over a long period of time [as] indicat[ing] that Chevron provides the appropriate 
legal lens through which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue”). The 
Court’s focus on a variety of factors does not suggest that those are the factors that should play 
into every analysis so much as an indicator that a variety of considerations argue for or against 
providing Chevron-level deference. Justice Breyer’s recent concurrence seems to concentrate on 
the multitude of ways in which to show substantial deference is warranted. See Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(noting “delegation ‘may be shown in a variety of ways’”). 
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2. Revenue rulings: proper authority and a reliable process 
As official pronouncements of the Internal Revenue Service, 
revenue rulings result from a “relatively formal administrative 
procedure” and therefore warrant substantial deference after Mead. A 
wide variety of reasons suggest that revenue rulings are the type of 
administrative pronouncement that deserves Chevron deference, 
including the following principles: Congress gave the IRS the type of 
authority suggesting such deference is warranted; Congress has 
provided indications that it considers these rulings significant and 
authoritative; revenue rulings derive from the necessary type of 
formal, fair, and deliberate procedure; the policies underlying these 
rulings argue in favor of giving them deference; and their inherent 
limits support such deference.  
As seemingly required under Mead, Congress clearly gave the 
IRS considerable authority to administer the revenue scheme of the 
United States. Not only does the Service have specific congressional 
directives under which it issues regulations,212 but it also has general 
authority and power to “prescribe all needful rules and 
regulations,”213 with which it issues general directive regulations and 
revenue rulings.214 At least for some of these IRS pronouncements, 
Congress intends them to have the force of law. While there may be 
no direct or explicit statement by Congress that revenue rulings 
should carry the force of law, these statements by the IRS do follow 
from the general authority given to the Service.215
Additionally, there is some indication that revenue rulings do 
carry the force of law in the eyes of Congress. Specifically, Congress 
has provided that “any failure to make a reasonable attempt to 
comply with” IRS revenue rulings and regulations will result in 
added penalties for underpayment.216 Thus, not only does the IRS 
 212. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
 213. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (West 2004); see also Coverdale, supra note 7, at 67. 
 214. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 216. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) & (c) (West 2004); see also Coverdale, supra note 7, at 71–72 
(discussing how “‘careless, reckless, or intentional’ disregard of a revenue ruling may expose a 
taxpayer to a penalty”). I.R.C. § 6662 states the following: 
(a) Imposition of penalty. If this section applies to any portion of an underpayment 
of tax required to be shown on a return, there shall be added to the tax an amount 
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employ its generally conferred authority in issuing revenue rulings, 
but Congress has specifically considered the use of such rulings in 
the United States’ revenue scheme.217 The inclusion of rulings in a 
congressional penalty provision further supports the force of these 
rulings. Professors Merrill and Watts have recently shown that early 
congressional inclusion of administrative pronouncements in penalty 
provisions conveyed the intent that these announcements carry the 
force of law.218 Arguably, then, revenue rulings are precisely the type 
of issuances Congress contemplated as having the force of law. 
Ultimately, Congress has delegated sufficient authority to the IRS to 
equal to 20 percent of the portion of the underpayment to which this section 
applies. 
(b) Portion of underpayment to which section applies. This section shall apply to the 
portion of any underpayment which is attributable to 1 or more of the following: 
(1) Negligence or disregard of rules or regulations. 
. . . . 
(c) Negligence. For purposes of this section, the term ‘negligence’ includes any 
failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title, and 
the term ‘disregard’ includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard. 
Id. § 6662(a)–(c). 
 217. Congress’s provision for penalties under I.R.C. § 6662 is a much stronger statement 
of intent for rulings to carry the force of law than that which the Court considered in Mead for 
tariff classifications. In Mead, the Court found indications that Congress contemplated the use 
of tariff classifications, and this conclusion counseled, in some respect, for providing deference. 
See Mead, 533 U.S. at 232. There Congress had considered these rulings in a parenthetical 
dealing with the “issuance of ‘regulations establishing procedures for the issuance of binding 
rulings prior to the entry of the merchandise concerned.’” Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1502(a) 
(2000)). Congress explicitly in section 6662 provided for penalties for anyone who disregards 
rulings. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1). Moreover, rulings in this section are placed on the same level as 
IRS regulations, which typically go through notice-and-comment procedures. See id. 
 218. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 174, at 472. Merrill and Watts suggest that 
[a]lthough the language of most rulemaking grants is facially ambiguous, we argue 
in this Article that these grants were not ambiguous during the formative years of 
the modern administrative state—up to and beyond the enactment of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. Throughout the Progressive and New 
Deal eras, Congress followed a drafting convention that signaled to agencies 
whether particular rulemaking grants conferred authority to make rules with the 
force of law as opposed to mere housekeeping rules. That convention was simple 
and easy to apply in most cases: If Congress specified in the statute that a violation 
of agency rules would subject the offending party to some sanction—for example, a 
civil or criminal penalty; loss of a permit, license, or benefits; or other adverse legal 
consequences—then the grant conferred power to make rules with the force of law. 
Id. While this discussion is intriguing, this Comment ultimately argues for a slightly different 
emphasis or analysis under Mead, one that does not look solely to congressional intent (or even 
verbal formulations). 
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issue revenue rulings for these rulings to receive substantial 
deference, even though no specific statement declares they should or 
do carry the force of law.219 Revenue rulings also have resulted from 
sufficient procedures to warrant heightened deference. 
In addition to arising out of the IRS’s sufficient authority to 
issue revenue rulings, these pronouncements also result from the 
type of procedure contemplated by the Court in Mead when it stated 
that Chevron deference was warranted for announcements that have 
“some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.”220 The 
IRS does not issue revenue rulings by notice-and-comment 
rulemaking or adjudication.221 Revenue rulings do arise, however, 
from a formal, fair, and deliberate procedure that is centralized in the 
IRS and Treasury Department. Revenue rulings result from a 
standard process, circulated through the same individuals within the 
IRS and Treasury Department,222 “demonstrating that a ‘central 
board or office’ accords a great ‘degree of . . . care’ to their 
issuance.”223 Moreover, while the rulings may derive from various 
divisions, they all arise from the same office, the office of the 
Associate Chief Counsel (Technical).224 These rulings are then sent 
through various review procedures for in-depth analysis by either 
“the Branch Chief, the Senior Technical Advisor, or the Assistant to 
the Branch Chief,” then by “the Associate Chief Counsel 
(Litigation)” and by “the Assistant Counsel.”225 The revenue rulings 
are “reviewed by the Associate Chief Counsel (Technical) and the 
Chief Counsel,” after which both “the Commissioner and . . . the 
Treasury” review the rulings before they are finally published in the 
Internal Revenue Bulletin.226 This type of structured and 
multilayered procedure stands in stark contrast to the type of 
 219. See supra note 186–193 and accompanying text. As the earlier discussion proves, the 
administrative agency must have some authority, or indication of authority, for Chevron 
deference to apply. Of course, the analysis does not end with the authority provided to the 
agency. 
 220. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. 
 221. See supra notes 46–47, 58 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 223. Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Mead, 
533 U.S. at 228, 236). 
 224. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 225. SALTZMAN, supra note 1, ¶ 3.03[2][a]. 
 226. Id. 
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issuances that concerned the Court in Mead, issuances that emanated 
from forty-six different offices at a rate of about 10,000 a year.227
The procedure for issuing revenue rulings provides both the 
“fairness and deliberation” that the Court looked for in determining 
which processes gave rise to Chevron deference.228 Principally, this 
fairness occurs from the nature of the revenue ruling: it is essentially 
a request from a party or parties involved in a transaction for the 
Service’s position on the Tax Code’s application to a factual 
scenario.229 Fairness inheres in the dialogue arising out of the public 
request for clarity. Additionally, the process involves precisely the 
type of deliberation necessary to warrant deference. The procedure 
includes having these issues of law applied to factual scenarios 
initially reviewed by an attorney, and reviewed again at almost every 
level of the Service and Treasury Department.230 Rulings do not 
result from the same type of process, or lack thereof, as mere “policy 
statements, agency manuals, [or] enforcement guidelines,”231 which 
do not require any formal process for formation or review. While the 
revenue ruling process does not involve the same type of comment 
or evidence gathering procedure as notice-and-comment rulemaking 
or adjudication, the process does involve a fair opportunity for 
members of the public, or even special interest groups, to influence 
the ruling process. 
In addition to having a rather formal and thorough formation 
process, revenue rulings also deserve Chevron deference because of 
the policies underlying their use and because of their inherent limits. 
The procedure for issuing revenue rulings provides precisely the 
 227. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 233 (“Any suggestion that rulings intended to have the 
force of law are being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency’s 46 scattered offices 
is simply self-refuting.”). 
 228. Id. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative 
action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure 
tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such 
force.”); see also Coverdale, supra note 7, at 89–90 (arguing that revenue rulings deserve only 
Skidmore respect after Mead but also contending that rulings should “rank high on the scale of 
Skidmore deference because of the great care put into their preparation”). While Professor 
Coverdale ultimately comes to what this Comment argues is the wrong conclusion, his 
appreciation for the procedure and process of issuing revenue rulings and the unique deference 
they deserve is well founded. 
 229. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra note 58. 
 231. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
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compromise between “fairness and deliberation” and reality. While 
the Court in Mead was obviously concerned with the formality of 
proceedings,232 it also remained sympathetic and understanding to 
the realities of administering a regulatory scheme. Had the Court 
desired to confine Chevron deference to APA procedures, it would 
have simply limited its grant of heightened deference to notice-and-
comment rulemaking and adjudication.233 However, the Court 
expanded the types of procedures that may qualify for substantial 
deference by both listing another category and also by 
acknowledging the Court’s own grant of Chevron deference in cases 
involving procedures other than those under the APA.234 
The Court’s openness to other procedures derives from an 
understanding of the realities of administrative agencies. For a highly 
involved regulatory scheme, like the ones in which the Court is likely 
to find pronouncements carrying Chevron’s deference, agencies have 
a variety of procedures available for administering their responsibility. 
While certain means of administering a scheme naturally foster more 
fairness and deliberation, realities such as time constraints require a 
compromise. For example, notice-and-comment practices are 
“cumbersome, time consuming, and expensive procedure[s].”235 
Such a process creates an unrealistic time frame to respond to 
requests from the public on how the revenue laws apply to specific 
factual scenarios at a specific time. Thus, the Service has instituted 
revenue rulings, which allow the IRS to respond to these 
complicated issues fairly quickly, but with the time and attention 
necessary to carry substantial deference. 
One of the major purposes behind revenue rulings—voluntary 
compliance—also counsels in favor of granting these rulings 
substantial deference. Compliance with the revenue laws is one of 
 232. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (talking of APA procedures as qualifying for signs of 
congressional intent and therefore Chevron deference); id. at 229 (speaking of a good indicator 
of congressional delegation as “the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces 
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed”); id. at 230 (stating that the common 
recipient of Chevron deference in the Court’s jurisprudence has been issuances derived from 
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication). 
 233. The only two APA procedures mentioned in Mead are notice-and-comment 
rulemaking and adjudication. Furthermore, these two procedures are potentially the only types 
of real “lawmaking” available under the APA. 
 234. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227; id. at 230–31. 
 235. See Coverdale, supra note 7, at 86. 
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the main reasons the IRS issues revenue rulings.236 Compliance, in 
turn, is probably among the most essential means behind the smooth 
operation of the United States’ revenue laws.237 Providing revenue 
rulings with only Skidmore’s respect would substantially defeat the 
purpose and importance of these pronouncements. Public reliance 
on these applications of revenue law to factual scenarios rests on the 
idea that they represent the official position of the IRS, and any 
transaction taken on that announcement is protected. Revenue 
rulings are designed to address these concerns specifically.238 Not 
only are they the official position of the IRS, but they also bind the 
IRS and form precedent for others involved in similar factual 
scenarios.239 If courts do not give these rulings the deference they 
deserve, the undergirding foundation for compliance with these 
pronouncements will collapse. Parties will increasingly challenge the 
IRS’s position and attempt to persuade the courts that their position 
is better. Without deference, the IRS, as well as other parties, will be 
forced to rely on the luck of litigation. Ultimately, mere respect 
threatens to eliminate one major means for the agency to set and 
protect its policies, an area that has been consistently afforded great 
deference. 
Lastly, the limits placed on revenue rulings argue for granting 
them substantial deference. IRS pronouncements embodied in 
revenue rulings do not touch on broad areas or cover expansive 
issues. Rather, these rulings are limited to the factual scenarios posed 
to the IRS on specific issues confronting the Revenue Code or its 
regulations at that time.240 Thus, the IRS’s use of revenue rulings is 
constrained by the public need for information and guidance on 
specific issues of tax law. The formal process that gives rise to 
revenue rulings combined with the regulatory need for faster 
responses to tough issues and the need for voluntary compliance 
suggest that revenue rulings should receive substantial deference 
after Mead.  
 236. See supra note 63 and accompanying quote. 
 237. See supra note 28 (concerning the importance of voluntary compliance). 
 238. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 239. See id. 
 240. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, Mead did nothing to remove the substantial 
deference that revenue rulings deserve from courts. Many courts 
have viewed the Court’s discussion in Mead as requiring some rigid 
notion of congressional intent that an agency’s pronouncements 
carry the force of law. Mead’s focus does not, however, rest solely on 
such congressional intent. Rather, after Mead, courts ought to look 
for indications of Congress’s delegation of power to administrative 
agencies, acknowledging that general grants of power may be 
sufficient to satisfy Mead. In addition, courts should examine the 
procedure for issuing the pronouncements for which deference is 
claimed. Fairly formal, fair, and deliberate procedures under a 
general grant of authority deserve Chevron’s heightened deference.  
Revenue rulings derive from exactly the authority and procedures 
that warrant substantial deference. Congress has given power to the 
IRS to prescribe all needful things, and, moreover, has indicated that 
it considers rulings to have authority. More importantly, the 
procedures by which the Service issues rulings are precisely the fair, 
deliberate, and rather formal procedures the Court indicated 
warranted heightened deference.  
Ryan C. Morris 
 
 
